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I. HISTORY OF SEPARATION OF POWERS IN GERMAN CONSTITUTIONS
The separation-of-powers concept was not legally recognized in
Germany until comparatively late. While this maxim has been
part of the Constitution of the United States of America since
1787 and also firmly anchored in the French Constitution in
1791,1 the realization of a genuine separation of powers was op-
posed in Germany for quite a long time. The origins of this devel-
opment can be seen in the early constitutions of German states.
The Constitutional Charter for the State of Prussia dating back to
January 31, 1850, for instance, stipulated that representatives of
the people had to be involved in legislation through so-called
chambers. 2 Furthermore, judicial power was exercised in the
name of the King by independent courts that fell under no juris-
diction other than that of the law.
3
The separation of powers was more clearly expressed in the con-
stitutions of some German states after the First World War. One
example is the Republic of Baden's Constitution, dated March 21,
1919, which expressly assigns state power to legislative, executive,
and judicial authorities. 4 This decision noticeably ties in with de-
liberations by Montesquieu, who drew a distinction between legis-
lation, administration, and adjudication in his magnum opus De
lEsprit des Lois as early as 1748. 5 However, the separation-of-
powers concept as understood in this way did not initially become
accepted from a national perspective. The Constitution of the
German Empire, dated April 16, 1871, referred to as Bismarck's
Reich Constitution, established a system of combining and blend-
ing different powers. Separation of functions occurred only at a
lower level. 6
Amazingly, the Weimar Republic Constitution, dated August 11,
1919, tied in with this combined system and refrained from a clear
stipulation in favor of a separation of powers. The National So-
cialist dictatorship that reigned from 1933 until 1945 marked the
dawn of a dark era for the separation of powers and the freedom of
1. 1791 CONST. tit. III, arts. 3-5 (Fr.).
2. 1850 VERF. PRUSSIA [Prussian Constitution of 1850] art. 62.
3. Id. art. 86, 1.
4. 1919 VERF. BADEN [Baden Constitution of 1919] § 2, sentence 2.
5. See MONTESQUIEU, DE LESPRIT DES LOIS [SPIRIT OF THE LAWS] 162-63 (G. Truc ed.,
Paris 1949) (1748).




the individual. These principles are the very antithesis of the cen-
tralistic structure of this oppressive state.
The separation-of-powers concept experienced a renaissance at
the end of the Second World War. The initiative re-emerged from
the states. Their constitutions, which were decreed during 1946
and 1947 (that is to say, before the Basic Law (the new Constitu-
tion of the Federal Republic of Germany) came into force), con-
tained a clear commitment to separation of powers. A typical ex-
ample is the Constitution of the Free State of Bavaria, dated De-
cember 2, 1946. In Article 5, Paragraph 1, it assigns legislative
power exclusively to the people and to the representatives of the
people. 7 Conversely, executive power lies in the hands of the state
government and the subordinate administrative bodies. Judicial
power is exercised by independent courts.8
The constitutions that emerged during the same period for the
states that, at the time, still existed in the Soviet-occupied zone at
first seemed to continue to adhere to the separation of powers.
But in reality, socialistic elements were predominant. This under-
current is evidenced by the Constitution of the State of Thuringia,
dated December 20, 1946. 9 State power, then, not only has to
come from the people and be exercised by the people, but it also
must serve their well-being.10
II. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SEPARATION OF POWERS IN THE
BASIC LAW
The preliminary work on the Basic Law was slow to embrace
the separation-of-powers concept. The so-called Lake Chiem Draft
of a Basic Constitutional Law, dated August 25, 1948, stipulated
the separation of powers only for the German states.11 Accord-
ingly, legislation, executive power, and adjudication have to be
exercised by bodies of equal ranking, regardless of the govern-
ment's responsibility vis-A-vis the state parliament. However, in
the later drafts of the Parliamentary Council-a committee of rep-
resentatives of the states-that discussed the final version of the
Basic Law, separation of powers also was established at the fed-
7. 1946 VERF. BAVARIA [Bavarian Constitution of 1946] art. 5, 1.
8. Id. art. 5, 2-3.
9. See, e.g., 1946 VERF. THURINGIA [Thuringian Constitution of 1946] art. 3, 1.
10. Id.
11. Lake Chiem Draft art. 29, 3, in REPORT ON THE LAKE CHIEM CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION, AUG. 10 TO 23, 1948 64 (1951).
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eral level. 12 These drafts stipulated that the people exercise state
power in legislation, administration, and adjudication separately
for each of these areas through special bodies in accordance with
this Basic Law. Moreover, adjudication and administration
should be governed by the law.
These formulations in the drafts of the Parliamentary Council
created the direct basis for the separation of powers to be an-
chored in the Basic Law, which was proclaimed on May 23, 1949.13
The key provision is Article 20, Paragraph 2.14 Accordingly, all
state power comes from the people. 15 It is exercised by the people
in elections and referendums. State power is realized through
special bodies for legislation, for executive power, and adjudica-
tion. This fundamental decision contains three basic statements,
which, though interconnected, convey messages of their own. On
the one hand, the people are recognized as the original holders of
state power. On the other, the way in which the people exercise
state power is decidedly settled: by elections and referendums.
Referendums are direct plebiscite decisions regarding particular
matters-the reorganization of the states, for instance. One ac-
tual example is the highly-publicized 1996 referendum on the uni-
fication of the states of Berlin and Brandenburg. (This referen-
dum did not, however, achieve the required majority.) Elections
have more practical significance for the realization of state power.
Elections call upon individuals who exercise state power and, in
doing so, directly and democratically legitimize the government by
the people's vote. The Basic Law stipulates elections only for the
representatives of the German Bundestag, the Lower House of
Parliament. 16 This provision also specifies the requirements to be
satisfied in this process. Accordingly, elections must be general,
direct, free, equal, and confidential. 17 These principles of electoral
law also are binding for electing the representatives of the state
parliaments and the local government representatives.' 8 This re-
quirement not only guarantees a minimum degree of homogeneity
between the constitutions of the government and the states in this
12. Minutes 12.48/329, Parliamentary Council, Principal Comm., 4th Sess., at 4 (1948)
(F.R.G.).
13. GRUNDGESETZ [GGI [Constitution] (F.R.G.).
14. GG art. 20, 1 2.
15. Id.
16. Id. art. 38, 1.
17. Id.
18. Id. art. 28, 1.
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issue, but it also recognizes the fact that elections take place at
this state level, too.
III. EMBODIMENT OF SEPARATION OF POWERS IN THE BASIC LAW
The key statement on the separation of powers is contained in
the final clause of Article 20, Paragraph 2. It demands that the
state power legitimized by the people be exercised through special
bodies for legislation, for executive power, and for adjudication.
This constitutional embodiment of the separation-of-powers prin-
ciple is corroborated in conjunction with the guarantees of funda-
mental rights through Article 1, Paragraph 3. Accordingly, the
basic rights bind legislation, executive power, and adjudication as
directly applicable law.
A. State Authority as a Reference Point
The Basic Law governs the exercise of state power in these sub-
areas in separate sections. Section 7 divides the responsibility for
legislation between the federal government and the states. 19 It
comprises the principle that the states possess the power to legis-
late. The government possesses the power of legislation only if the
Basic Law itself assigns to it the jurisdiction for specific topics. 20
Regardless of this constitutional exception to the rule, the main
focus in constitutional practice is on federal law. This divergence
between the regulatory claims of the Constitution and the consti-
tutional reality was one reason why, in 2006, the power to legis-
late held by the states was expanded and reinforced as part of the
so-called federalism reform.21
Section 8 settles the responsibility for executing federal laws. 22
In principle, this responsibility, unless otherwise stipulated or
permitted by the Basic Law, lies with the states. Such an alterna-
tive assignment of administrative power to the government is lim-
ited to certain regulatory matters. These matters include, for ex-
ample, the Foreign Service, the Federal Border Guard, and the
Armed Forces. 23 The Basic Law deals, in its own section, with ad-
judication-the so-called third power. Articles 92 to 104 govern
court organization and judicial independence. They also contain
19. GG arts. 70-82.
20. See id. arts. 73-74.
21. Amending law to the Basic Law, Aug. 28, 2006, BGB1. I at 2034.
22. GG arts. 83-91.
23. Id. art. 87, 1; id. at art. 87b, 1.
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important procedural guarantees, such as the jurisdiction of the
judge being determined by law in advance. 24 These provisions
leave no doubt that the separation-of-powers principle has been
laid out in the Basic Law.
B. Modifications in the Understanding of Separation of Powers
All this conclusion does, however, is open the floodgates to a
host of contentious legal issues concerning the separation of pow-
ers. One key reason is that this principle is not realized in the
Basic Law as a strict separation. Instead, it permits breaches un-
der various exceptions, which will be discussed in detail later.
Suffice it to say that, at this stage, a flawless, strict separation
system is not possible because the complex conditions require a
certain interaction between the various parts of state power. The
question, therefore, is not whether such a procedure is permitted
at all, but in which cases, under which conditions, and to what
extent such breaches of the separation of powers are to be ac-
cepted. The answer is held mainly in the specific parameters of
the Basic Law. This contention will be explained in detail later.
25
It must be stated, though, that it is not about a strict separation
or simple division of state power. According to the constitutional
order of the Federal Republic of Germany, which is settled by the
Basic Law, the organization of power through the division and
structuring of functions predominates. The concept of separating
the powers has evolved into the idea of sharing responsibility and
distributing functions. This idea creates the basis for carrying out
public duties in divided and related responsibility. This altered
appreciation also is reflected in a changed concept. Instead of the
separation of powers, we now talk in Germany mainly about a
separation of functions, 26 a distribution of functions, 27 or a struc-
turing of powers.28 The term separation of powers can therefore
only continue to be used if it is not equated with a strict division
or separation and instead becomes receptive to this transformed
understanding. Only the tradition of parlance would have this
24. Id. art. 101, 1, sentence 2.
25. See discussion infra Part IV.
26. Hans-Detlef Horn, Gewaltenteilige Demokratie, Demokratische Gewaltenteilung
[The Separate Powers of Democracy, The Democratic Division of Power], 127 ASR 427, 431
(2002).
27. 2 KLAUS STERN, DAS STAATSRECHT DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [THE
PUBLIC LAW OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY] 520 (1980).
28. See CHRISTOPH MOLLERS, GEWALTENGLIEDERUNG [POWER ARRANGEMENT] (2005).
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term retained. However, the term does not appropriately convey
the features. This argument carries a good deal of weight. In the
current historical moment, separation of powers should be relin-
quished and superseded by the terms distribution of functions or
structuring of powers.29
IV. STRUCTURE OF THE REGULATION OF SEPARATION OF POWERS
IN THE BASIC LAW
A. Distinction Between Material, Organizational, and Personal
Separation of Functions
Regardless of terminology preferences, the structure of separa-
tion of powers in Germany must now be conveyed. This structure
becomes clear if we take a holistic look at the provisions of the Ba-
sic Law, which divide or connect state power. At the federal level,
a distinction can be drawn according to how the assignment is
linked, between material, organizational, and personal separation
of powers. 30
B. Principle and Exceptions of Material Separation of Functions
Material separation of powers is commonly described as a mate-
rial separation or distribution of functions. The idea is that the
material state functions of legislation, administration, and adjudi-
cation are primarily and in principle assigned to a body estab-
lished specifically for fulfilling this responsibility.
31
1. The Relationship Between Legislative and Executive
According to the system of functions in the Basic Law, norm-
setting falls primarily to the Bundestag, the Lower House of Par-
liament, as the legislative power. The federal government, as the
highest executive body, is assigned the government and the ad-
ministration as main tasks. Courts are assigned adjudication.
The relationship between these functions and the administering
bodies is arranged essentially by two structural principles. First
is the legal obligation stipulated in Article 20. Parliamentary law
is obligatory for bodies of executive power and adjudication. This
principle is comparable to the Supremacy Clause in Article VI of
29. Id. at 25.
30. 2 STERN, supra note 27, at 795-96 (2d ed. 1984).
31. Id. at 795.
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the Constitution of the United States of America. The submission
to parliamentary laws is repeated again for the judiciary in Article
97, Paragraph 1. The second is the unwritten principle that the
core area concerned is assigned exclusively to the bodies envisaged
specifically for this purpose and cannot be touched. This tradition
precludes breaches. 32 The difficulty, however, lies in determining
the core area of each function. It can generally be paraphrased as
the functions that are typical, formative, and constitutive for the
particular function area. 33 This definition, though, conveys a cer-
tain ambiguity. It therefore is criticized in part.34 However, there
has not yet been any success with developing more suitable de-
marcation criteria. Thus, we should stick to the concept of the
core area and the associated protective effects.
In certain cases, the interpretation of the maxim first men-
tioned-the principle of rule of law establishing a legal obligation
for the executive and the judiciary---can cause problems. First,
this principle means that executive power and adjudication have
to comply with parliamentary laws when making decisions. These
laws must not be disregarded or ignored. If they are, the decisions
will be illegal by virtue of the conflict-of-laws rule of priority of the
law. Article 20, Paragraph 3 also contains the so-called Vorbehalt
des Gesetzes, a principle difficult to translate.35 By its effects, the
legislature, which is legitimized democratically and directly, has
the exclusive jurisdiction on all essential decisions made by the
government. 36 Essential in this context primarily means meas-
ures that interfere with citizens' basic rights. This doctrine does
not, in principle, preclude the executive branch's power to under-
take administrative duties, but it does demand a sufficiently de-
terminate parliamentary law. Only for a few matters, such as im-
prisonment, for instance, is regulation reserved for the Parliament
(Bundestag) and precludes any action of executive power. 37 Out-
side of this area, the principle demands only an adequately deter-
mined normative programming of executive power. In this way,
the principle of the Vorbehalt des Gesetzes, which establishes the
necessity of a parliamentary law, substantiates the principle of
32. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] 9, 268 (280)
(F.R.G.); id. at 34, 52 (59); id. at 67, 100 (139); id. at 95, 1 (15).
33. 2 STERN, supra note 27, at 542.
34. Horn, supra note 26, at 438-40.
35. See 2 STERN, supra note 27, at 802-15.
36. This is the so-called Essential Decisions Doctrine. See BVerfGE 40, 237 (249); id. at
49, 89 (127); id. at 59, 257 (278); id. at 77, 170 (230-231); id. at 83, 130 (152).
37. GG art. 104, 1, sentence 1.
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the material separation of functions between legislative and ex-
ecutive.
According to this principle, the core areas of these state authori-
ties must always be respected. Yet, outside this area, the princi-
ple of separation of powers is subject to different interdependen-
cies and limitations. Interdependencies occur, for example, when
decreeing federal laws, for which Articles 77 and 78 stipulate vari-
ous forms of involvement by the so-called Bundesrat, the Federal
Council. This Upper House of Parliament represents the German
states. In principle, the Federal Council is entitled only to an ob-
jection that has the effect of a suspensive veto. As an exception,
however, the Basic Law requires certain federal laws to be ap-
proved by the Federal Council. This requirement appears espe-
cially when the federal law concerns essential matters of the
states.38 The states can realize their interests through the Federal
Council, which is composed of members of the state governments.
If the Federal Council refuses the required consent, decreeing of
the federal law is not temporarily inhibited, but rather has ulti-
mately failed. So, the involvement of the Federal Council results
in the restriction of the legislative function of the Lower House
(Bundestag).
This Upper House veto power is justified by the state structure
of the Federal Republic of Germany. From the perspective of a
material separation of functions, the involvement of the Federal
Council exhibits an additional peculiarity in that it is a multiple-
power body. According to Article 50, the states are involved
through the Federal Council in legislation, in the administration
of the federal government, and in matters concerning the Euro-
pean Union.39 As an interim result, the Basic Law permits limita-
tions in the material separation of functions, first and foremost in
the relationship between legislation and executive power.
2. The Relationship Between the Judiciary on the One Hand
and the Legislative and Executive
However, with regard to adjudication, the principle of material
separation of functions is subject to only minor restrictions. Such
restrictions occur in the relationship between the judiciary and
legislative function because the judge is bound to parliamentary
38. See, e.g., id. art. 84, 7 1, sentence 6; see also, e.g., art. 85, 7 1, sentence 1.
39. Id. art. 23, 2, cl. 2; id. art. 23, 77 4-6.
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laws.40 In the relationship between the judiciary and executive,
restrictions for adjudication can result from having acknowledged
a core area of executive action. Within that core, in particular, are
counter-balance decisions by the administrative authorities.
These authorities have a scope by weighing different interests
that the courts must respect. These agency-level evaluations
bring about a reduction in judicial control density.
41
C. Principle and Exceptions of Organizational Separation of
Functions
Besides the material separation of functions, the principle of
separation of powers also includes the organizational separation of
functions. Idealized, it guarantees independence of the function-
holders from each other. 42 The Basic Law, however, permits
breaches of the principle to a broad extent. The most important
exception is the ongoing dependency of the federal government's
existence on Parliament. The legislature is a key feature in the
concept of a parliamentary government system that is established
by the Basic Law and evident in various places. The Federal
Chancellor is elected by the Bundestag.43 This Lower House can
express a vote of no-confidence to the Federal Chancellor if the
majority of members elect a successor and request the Federal
President to discharge the Federal Chancellor. The Federal
President must comply with this request and appoint the Chancel-
lor-elect as the new Federal Chancellor. 44 Throughout the history
of the Federal Republic of Germany, there have been two such at-
tempts at a so-called constructive vote of no-confidence. In 1972,
the attempt to vote out Chancellor Willy Brandt by electing the
opposition leader Rainer Barzel failed, but, in 1982, Helmut Kohl
was successfully elected in place of Helmut Schmidt.
Likewise, the Federal Chancellor also can personally request
that the Lower House expresses confidence. If the majority of the
members deny this request, the Federal President can, at the sug-
gestion of the Federal Chancellor, dissolve the Lower House
within twenty-one days.45 There have been four instances of this
40. Id. art. 97, 1.
41. Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung [VwGO] [Code of Administrative Procedure], Jan. 21,
1960, BGB1. I at 17, last amended June 17, 2008 by BGB1. I at 1010, § 114 (F.R.G.).
42. 2 STERN, supra note 27, at 795.
43. GG art. 63.
44. Id. art. 67.
45. Id. art. 68.
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dissolution to date. Federal Chancellors Brandt, Schmidt, Kohl,
and Schroder wanted to overcome a parliamentary standoff on the
issue of confidence by dissolving the Lower House and having a re-
election.46 The Federal Chancellor's strong dependency on the
Parliament in Germany largely restricts the principle of an organ-
izational separation of functions. In this regard, there is a key
difference from the separation of powers in the United States of
America, which permits an impeachment of the President by Con-
gress only under specific conditions.
47
D. Principle and Exceptions of Personal Separation of Functions
The third element of the separation of powers is the personal
separation of functions. This element requires dissimilarity in the
personnel filling of the various bodies. The official of a body of
power may not, in principle, belong to any other power. 48 The so-
called incompatibility concept is explicitly stated in only a few
places in the Basic Law. According to Article 55, Paragraph 1, the
Federal President may not belong to either the government or a
legislative body of the government or of a state. The members of
the Federal Constitutional Court may not belong to the Lower
House, the Federal Council, or any corresponding bodies of a
state.49 Conversely, in Article 137, Paragraph 1, the Basic Law
virtually leaves the regulation of the issue of whether executive
officials may belong to a parliament at the same time to the legis-
lature, which can restrict its members' eligibility for executive po-
sitions through the law.
The Basic Law does not establish personal separation of func-
tions in a central area, namely, the affiliation of a person to par-
liament and government. Compared with German law, the Con-
stitution of the United States contains considerably more exten-
sive stipulations for incompatibility. In the United States, no
member of Congress may hold a salaried federal office during the
period of mandate. 50 Conversely, it is difficult in both countries to
avoid the general risk of personal separation of functions, which
results from people belonging to the same party, and, for example,
fosters the spoils system.
46. These instances led to following decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court: see
BVerfGE 62, 1 et seq.; id. at 114, 121 et seq.
47. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; id. art. I, § 3, cls. 6-7; id. art. II, § 4.
48. 2 STERN, supra note 27, at 795-96.
49. GG art 94, 1, sentence 3.
50. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
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V. HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL DIMENSIONS OF SEPARATION OF
POWERS
A. Between the Federal Government and the States
In addition to the horizontal structuring of functions at the fed-
eral government level with its various ramifications and breaches,
this principle also has a vertical dimension. On the one hand, it
concerns the division of state power between the government and
the states. 51 In this regard, stricter stipulations apply than for the
horizontal structuring of powers. A shared exercising of functions
by the government and the states, specifically what we call in
Germany a "mixed or blended administration," is wholly undesir-
able. 52 An exception is allowed for so-called joint functions, such
as coastal protection. 5
3
The vertical dimension of separation of powers is assigned to the
federal-state principle and assessed according to the rules derived
from that principle. The distribution of power for legislation, ex-
ecutive action, and adjudication between the government and the
states results, from a vertical perspective, to a balancing of state
power. Just like the separation of powers, it ultimately serves to
protect the freedom of the individual against an unrestrained
state power. 54
B. Between the German Government and the European Union
The division of sovereign power between the Federal Republic of
Germany and the European Union is problematic. Thematically,
it also can be assigned to the vertical separation of powers. 55
Given the complexity and intricacy of the issues, I will stick to il-
lustrating a few main features. A special situation arises because
the European Union is a supranational entity, but not a state. It
51. See Christoph Mollers, Dogmatik der Grundgesetzlichen Gewaltengliederung
[Dogma of the Constitutional Power Arrangement], 132 AOR 493, 526 (2007); LAWRENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 123-37 (3d ed. 2000).
52. The Federal Constitutional Court considers such a form of administration as undue
in principle. BVerfGE 11, 105 (124); id. at 32, 145 (156); id. at 41, 291 (311).
53. GG art. 91a, 1.
54. See BVerfGE 104, 249 (279); KONRAD HESSE, GRUNDZOGE DES
VERFASSUNGSRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND (MAIN FEATURES OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY] 231 (20th ed. 1995); TRIBE,
supra note 51, at 123-37.
55. PAUL KIRCHHOF, GEWALTENBALANCE ZWISCHEN STAATLICHEN UND EUROPAISCHEN




qualifies neither as a federal state nor as a commonwealth. The
European Union is, in fact, a confederation. 56 The member states
are responsible for its emergence, its existence, and its develop-
ment. They are the "masters of the treaties" to whom the legal
community of the European Union owes its existence and the le-
gitimization of its actions.
57
Indeed, certain legal acts of the European Union, such as Euro-
pean Council regulations, create a direct effect for national au-
thorities and citizens. This claim to direct application is not
based, however, on original law-making power, but on the treaty
on the founding of the European Community.58 The treaty was
brokered by the member states and sanctioned by their democrati-
cally legitimized parliaments. This act of approval is the reason
for the application of European law in Germany. Only by crossing
this bridge can it attain intrastate validity. Legal acts of the
European Union that do not fall under the consent law are not
binding for German state power or German citizens. 59 This proce-
dure of implementation limits the sovereignty of the European
Union.
Additional restrictions arise from the principles of limited indi-
vidual empowerment and subsidiarity, which are anchored in the
founding treaties, the so-called primary law of the European Un-
ion. According to these principles, the Union may operate only if,
in the articles of primary law, it is assigned jurisdiction to do so.
Furthermore, it may decree measures within this framework only
insofar as the goals cannot be reached at the member-state level
and, therefore, because of their scope or effects, would be better
taking place at the European level. 60 This restriction lends addi-
tional weight to the fundamental responsibility of the member
states for the exercise of state power. However, there may be no
conclusion drawn of these principles among the member states
because any law that the European Union decrees within its ju-
risdiction is binding for the member states. In the event of a con-
flict with national law, the national law will remain valid, but it
may not be applied.
61
56. "Staatenverbund" ["Confederation" lit. "State Group"]. See BVerfGE 89, 155 (186,
188); KIRCHHOF, supra note 55, at 967-68.
57. BVerfGE 89, 155 (190).
58. Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 249, 2, Nov. 10 1997, 1997
O.J. [hereinafter EC Treaty].
59. See BVerfGE 31, 145 (174).
60. EC Treaty art. 5, 1-2.
61. BVerfGE 73, 339 (375); id. at 75, 223 (244); id. at 85, 191 (204).
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Furthermore, the member states are obliged to participate in
European integration and its continuing development. This legal
obligation arises from the principle of community loyalty, which is
a key element of the articles of the primary law.62 In Germany,
Article 23, Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law contains a corresponding
obligation. Compliance with this obligation and the requirements
to be respected in the process are monitored by the Federal Con-
stitutional Court.63 In this regard, the Federal Constitutional
Court is in a relationship of cooperation with the European Court
of Justice. 64 The relationship of cooperation reflects the interlink-
ing between the European and German legal systems. This inter-
linking is led less by the idea of a strict separation of powers than
it is by an assignment, a distribution, and a balancing of func-
tions.
VI. CONCLUSION
The embodiment of the separation of powers in the Basic Law
shows that the essence of its original function is, through the re-
ciprocal control of legislation, executive power, and adjudication,
to restrict the power of the state and, hence, safeguard the free-
dom of the individual. This alignment is to be assigned, on its
merits, to the principle of rule of law. It is the expression of no-
confidence over a violation of state power. This notion of protec-
tion remains applicable. It therefore continues to shape the un-
derstanding of Article 20, Paragraph 2, which represents the cen-
tral constitutional regulation for the separation of powers.
In more recent times, the Federal Constitutional Court and rep-
resentatives of the law are assigning to the separation of powers a
further purpose, which is gaining in importance: the functional
adequate exercise of state authority. Accordingly, the distribution
and assignment of powers is geared toward ensuring that state
decisions are taken as "right" as possible. This means that they
are taken by the body that is best qualified to do so, through its
organization, composition, function, and procedure. 65 This goal
derives from the notion that different holders of state functions,
depending on organization and procedure, have different jurisdic-
tions. An optimized assignment of functions is therefore required,
62. EC Treaty art. 10.
63. See BVerfGE 89, 155 (186-90).
64. BVerfGE 89, 155 (175); id. at 102,147; id. at 118, 79.
65. BVerfGE 68, 1 (86); id. at 90, 286 (364); id. at 95, 1 (15); id. at 104, 151 (207).
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and decisions should be made by the agency that possesses the
capabilities required to do so. The more complex and heterogene-
ous the decision conditions are, the more important this aspect of
the division of power becomes. Its primary purpose is not to pro-
tect the freedom of the individual-it is to improve the effective-
ness of state actions.
66
This expanded function and modified alignment of the constitu-
tional principle of the separation of powers responds to changes in
the legal relationships between state and citizens. In this regard,
it is no longer only about protection against state intervention to
secure the citizens' freedom, but also it is about participation in
state benefits. The branches of government set the fundamental
conditions enabling legally guaranteed freedom to become a real-
ity. Separation of powers-understood as a demand for function-
adequate distribution of power-enhances the efficiency of exercis-
ing state authority and at the same time serves the interests of
the citizens. The judiciary and jurisprudence are called upon to
react to these interdependencies by further development of this
element of the separation of powers.
66. See Horn, supra note 26, at 448-51; WOLFGANG HOFFMANN-RIEM,
GEWALTENGLIEDERUNG UND VERANTWORTUNGSTEILUNG ALS ORDNUNGSPRINZIP [POWER
ARRANGEMENT AND THE DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITY AS A SYSTEM] 183, 186 (2008).
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